1. means. The nuclear test is an experiment that

1.     Background

 

Under Abe administration, Japan’s security
policy has made notable
changes to adjust the defiances of the 21st
century
in the international arena.
The effect of the changes on the future of Japanese security is an essential consideration for Japan’s foreign
relations and domestic policies. The recent conditions
at the Korean Peninsula have provoked the debate on Japan’s immortal challenge
of constitutional revision. While that is a renowned problem, other quantifies
are necessary to decrease the tensions. Recalling the improbability that DPRK
will surrender its nuclear program in deal with the sanctions and menaces,
Japan’s governments have to examine what they pragmatically can do as the superlative
regional of US to somehow come across the ways for sensible dialogue and
engagement with the US. In several months ago, Japan even world have witnessed
a horrible escalation of tensions in Northeast Asia which threaten the safety
of the international society. In less than a month, DPRK missiles have flown two
times over Japan’s territory. Collectively with DPRK’s sixth nuclear test,
those inclinations have provoked new influxes of UN sanctions, even as the
leaders Kim Jong-Un and Donald Trump have threatened to demolish each other’s
states. Towards this background, it is vital for Japan to make the right options
in regard to DPRK because geographically Japan’s territory is nearby with
DPRK’s territory.

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Before we discuss further about Japanese security policy to overcome this
urgency issue, let’s discuss first about what nuclear test means. The nuclear test is an experiment that using
nuclear weapons in order to know its true destructive power, in many cases it use as the national
power. Basically, the recent DPRK’s nuclear test was obvious enough
that the released over Japan was intended to show to the United States that
Guam is good within DPRK’s range. Even, the tests gave the remarkable anxiety for
Japan and to all countries over the world. Unfortunately, when WWII was ended Japan
has been in a treaty alliance with the US which obligates the latter to protect
the previous in the case of an attack and permits it to maintain bases on
Japanese mainlands and oceans. The Yoshida Doctrine sets that Japan makes a
specialty on economics and trade activities while leaving its protection to the
US, thus it seems to make japan not free to do anything related to security (Erik Isaksson, 2017).

In this paper, the writer will try to examine about the urgency of the
issue in the perspective of the Japanese government especially under Shinzo Abe
administration, also try to identify the problems that Japanese government
might face in regard to the issue, and also about the way of Shinzo Abe
government to resolve this issue.

 

2.    
Analysis

 

a.      
Japan’s responses up to now

In instantaneous react to the missile tests, the Japanese
government informed citizens in the location in which the missile passed
through to take shelter. Further, Japan has all started evacuation rehearsals
this year in regions probable to be focused in case of a DPRK assault. Globally,
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has tried hard to ensure that sanctions against the DPRK
are enacted and has revealed that the time for negotiations with Kim Jong-Un regime
is over. Since Abe has taken a strenuous position towards DPRK before, in terms
of nuclear weapons as well as on the issue of Japanese civilians abducted by DPRK
during the 1970s and 1980s, such hard talk was supposed. In long time, the
Japanese government thought the revision of the constitution as a necessary
measure to ensure Japan’s national safety.

In response, debates have been triggered in Japan over the likelihood of obtaining
the means to differently strike DPRK missiles. Supporters of an improvement
Japanese military tend to view the result of voyage missiles adequate of doing
so as a plausible defense measure, theoretically serving Japan with a kind of preventive
to DPRK skimming missiles over its territory. Nevertheless, even if Japan
wanted to shoot down a future DPRK missile, the constitutionality of such an
act is subject to debate as the constitution only serves for such an action in
the case of Japan is immediately assaulted (Yoshida, 2017). The 2014 reinterpretation of the
constitution in regard to the collective self defense probably could offer
legal cover for such an action. Nevertheless, Japan could practice corporate self
defense and shoot down missiles headed toward Guam only if the US clearly asked
Japan’s help. In order to provide the grounds to shoot down a missile
regardless of this constraint, Japan may have to convert its constitution.
These conversions to the constitution might prevent an

assaulter, but as a
measure to decrease tensions constitutional revision loses the point. Those
facts seem to become the obstacles for Japanese government to overcome this
issue freely.

b.     
Nuclear Reality
Check

The other precautions that are talked about in Japan are nuclear prevention.
Yet contrary to what some observers zero in on – Japan obtaining nuclear
weapons – the domestic debate generally revolves around allowing or not
allowing the US to station nuclear weapons on Japanese territory (Mizokami,
2017).
In 1967 Japan established its Three Non-Nuclear Principles which state that the
country shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor permit their
introduction into Japanese territory Some – notably former Defense Minister
Shigeru Ishiba – recently have argued for an open debate on the last of the
three principles, and on allowing the United States to place nuclear warheads
in Japan. This is, however, an unlikely proposition in a country with norms
that are strongly against nuclear weapons (AFP-Jiji). What’s more, future
potential LDP leadership candidates Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council
Fumio Kishida and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taro Kono, have recently come
out in opposition to revision of Japan’s policy of the non-nuclear principles (Shimbun, 2017). Again, whether or
not policies of rearmament assist to prevention, their capability to affect decreased
tensions is debatable.

 

c.      
Toward Dialogue and
Engagement

As for sanctions on DPRK, some fear that they might seriously destabilize
the economy and government of the country and precipitate a state collapse with
unknown consequences (Pitt, 2017).
Whilst the outcomes of the latest round of sanctions are not yet found, the
empirical record of sanctions is bad. This proposes that either manner the
pendulum swings on the success of sanctions, countries in the region must put
together for diplomacy and dialogue in a few form. During the mid- 2000s, when DPRK
announced its nuclear potential and tested missiles, normalized meetings
between Japan and DPRK continued, proving that cooperation is possible. The Stockholm Treaty in 2004 with DPRK, saw an appointment
of sanctions towards the country in exchange for Pyongyang’s cooperation in discovering
and reverting Japanese nationals kidnapped by DPRK.

However, today’s environment is
different and talks would have to achieve the other dimension and resolve the
core issues of the conflict. These core issues around how Japan

and other countries in the region can reassure DPRK that
its hostile behavior only further puts it at risk of what it fears the most
which is regime change. Fear of regime change is the reason for DPRK bellicosity
and for that reason efforts should be made toward subtraction of that fear, and
toward making DPRK understand how its behavior contributes to this. The
challenges when it comes to DPRK are complex, let say UN sanctions cannot be eliminated
without a changed DPRK policy, which is now out of the question if it is not
given incentives to do so. Moreover, increased bellicosity by DPRK does not drive
what can be seen as accommodating approaches. It is, however, better to
acknowledge sooner rather than later that whether or not sanctions work, the
next step that Japan can do in order to resolve this issue is through dialogue.
In the long run, there is a demand for a regional security structure that can
deal with urgent problems like the one that DPRK poses. In the short term,
however, as a former companion in the six-party talks and a country that has
experience in dealing with DPRK, Japan has the opportunity to make the good
impact through an effort toward dialogue. Although Japan does not posses the
magic settlement, it is definitely part of it.

 

 

 

3.     
Conclusion

 

In the end, as the nearby
country of DPRK, Japan have to try to overcome the issue in regard to DPRK
nuclear test. This issue is an urgent issue because it happened unexpectedly.
While Japan tries to find ways to resolve this issue, many obstacles that faced
by the Japanese government. Japan assumed that although there is small
likelihood to resolve this issue but Japan thought it doesn’t rule of the
possibility that resolves this issue will work in the future.