LITERATURE assess the likelihood that the leaked data came



1)  Multiple re-watermarking scenarios

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 A. Mascher-Kampfer, H. St€ogner, and A. Uhl


The use of classical robust watermarking
techniques for multiple re-watermarking is discussed. In particular we focus on
a comparison of the usefulness of blind and non-blind algorithms for this type
of applications. A surprisingly high number of watermarks may be embedded using
both approaches, provided that additional data is recorded in the non-blind


2) Data leakage detection


Papadimitriou and H. Garcia-Molina


We study the following problem: A data
distributor has given sensitive data to a set of supposedly trusted agents
(third parties). Some of the data are leaked and found in an unauthorized place
(e.g., on the web or somebody’s laptop). The distributor must assess the
likelihood that the leaked data came from one or more agents, as opposed to
having been independently gathered by other means. We propose data allocation
strategies (across the agents) that improve the probability of identifying
leakages. These methods do not rely on alterations of the released data (e.g.,
watermarks). In some cases, we can also inject “realistic but fake” data
records to further improve our chances of detecting leakage and identifying the
guilty party.


3)  Secure spread spectrum watermarking for


AUTHORS:  I. J. Cox, J. Kilian, F. T. Leighton, and T.


This paper presents a secure
(tamper-resistant) algorithm for watermarking images, and a methodology for
digital watermarking that may be generalized to audio, video, and multimedia
data. We advocate that a watermark should be constructed as an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random vector that is imperceptibly
inserted in a spread-spectrum-like fashion into the perceptually most
significant spectral components of the data. We argue that insertion of a
watermark under this regime makes the watermark robust to signal processing
operations (such as lossy compression, filtering, digital-analog and
analog-digital conversion, requantization, etc.), and common geometric
transformations (such as cropping, scaling, translation, and rotation) provided
that the original image is available and that it can be successfully registered
against the transformed watermarked image. In these cases, the watermark
detector unambiguously identifies the owner. Further, the use of Gaussian
noise, ensures strong resilience to multiple-document, or collusional, attacks.
Experimental results are provided to support these claims, along with an
exposition of pending open problems









 Asymmetric fingerprinting for larger


AUTHORS:  B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner


Fingerprinting schemes deter people from
illegal copying of digital data by enabling the merchant of the data to
identify the original buyer of a copy that was redistributed illegally. All
known fingerprinting schemes are symmetric in the following sense: Both the
buyer and the merchant know the fingerprinted copy. Thus, when the merchant
finds this copy somewhere, there is no proof that it was the buyer who put it
there, and not the merchant.

We introduce asymmetric fingerprinting.
where only the buyer knows the fingerprinted copy, and the merchant, upon
finding it somewhere, can find out and prove to third parties whose copy it
was. We present a detailed definition of this concept and constructions. The
first construction is based on a quite general symmetric fingerprinting scheme
and general cryptographic primitives; it is provably secure if all these
underlying schemes are. We also present more specific and more efficient











A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks


Goldwasser, S. Micali, and R. L. Rivest


We present a digital signature scheme
based on the computational difficulty of integer factorization. The scheme
possesses the novel property of being robust against an adaptive chosen-message
attack: an adversary who receives signatures for messages of his choice (where
each message may be chosen in a way that depends on the signatures of
previously chosen messages) cannot later forge the signature of even a single
additional message. This may be somewhat surprising, since in the folklore the
properties of having forgery being equivalent to factoring and being
invulnerable to an adaptive chosen-message attack were considered to be
contradictory. More generally, we show how to construct a signature scheme with
such properties based on the existence of a “claw-free” pair of
permutations–a potentially weaker assumption than the intractibility of
integer factorization. The new scheme is potentially practical: signing and
verifying signatures are reasonably fast, and signatures are compact.