Mohammed politically, it also provided a promising and demanding

Mohammed Mossadegh was extremely opposed to foreign intervention in Iran, and he became a vocal advocate for the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry until he was removed in 1953 by US and UK funded coup d’etat. Following his overthrow, Mohammed Reza Shah’s control of Iran was reinforced, and his pro-Western viewpoint directly added to the anti-Western mindset of many of the ‘inciters of the 1979 Islamic Revolution’. The level of participation by the US steadily increased during the post-war and Cold War period until the dramatic events of the Islamic Revolution. The US’s policy of soviet containment was logically extended into the Persian region, and the Soviet Union’s military presence in Iran was eliminated after the arrival of the Americans. 
While the US helped improve Iran economically and politically, it also provided a promising and demanding market for Iranian oil & while the US certainly had self-interest in mind in dealings with Iran, its own advancement was not its sole concern. With increased involvement and a growing interest in the well-being of the US’s strongest ally in the Middle East, the US increasingly became interested in supporting the actions of the Shah, and it didn’t recognize or foresee the fermenting problems resulting from Western impositions on the tradition lifestyles of Arab Muslims. The US gradually became more involved in both the internal and external affairs of Iran. America did, however, eventually become more concern with Iran’s strength as an ally than America’s ability to help Iran’s political and economic well-being. Through the various American missions to Iran, relations strengthened, and America’s growth as a world power paralleled Iran’s growing sense of nationalism and desire for independence.
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh’s main goal was to modernize and democratize Iran, and for this he was immediately at odds with the nation’s monarch Mohammad Reza Shah. He had passionate beliefs in democracy and nationalism, and he even had a European education that set it ahead and apart from other leaders at the time. Additionally, he frequently looked to natural resources in which revenues favored greater Iranian existence— eventually bringing his own attention to the British Oil giant ‘BP’. Seeking to keep oil revenues at home for the betterment of his people, Mossadegh proposed a plan that would nationalize Iran’s oil fields. The nationalization law, providing monetary compensation for the British Oil facilities, was unanimously approved by both houses of the Iranian parliament. However, the British Prime minister was enraged over it, eventually making a plea to Washington by the British Intelligence to come to their rescue and cease his actions in Iran. Knowing that a call to overthrow Mossadegh because he nationalized one of the British’s oil companies would not upset the US and/or stir American support, the British decided on an alternative to get their way and ultimately involve the United States in conflict with the Middle Eastern country to last a lifetime. They proposed the plan of portraying Mossadegh’s rule as Communist infiltration and that the risk of leaving Iran open to the Soviet’s aggression, was a ‘compelling’ enough factor in the addition of American action. 
Following newly elected US President Eisenhower’s approval, planning the coup began— ultimately, the British were able to coalesce the US into backing them and their plan. The plan that they decided upon was on a whole other level, and was explained as ‘unlikely anything the CIA or British agents had ever seen before’. On August 19th, thousands took to the streets of Tehran demanding Mossadegh’s resignation. The coup, codename Operation Ajax, having successfully ousted Mossadegh, concluded with Mohammad Reza Shah returning to his throne with a feeling of safety, and Mossadegh sitting in jail. Operation Ajax overthrew the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and suppressed the oil nationalization movement. The United States, with pressure from Great Britain, played a major role in the overthrow of Mossadegh and the establishment of Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi as an absolute monarch. The Eisenhower administration took steps to neutralize Mossadegh, in part because it viewed the oil nationalization issue through a Cold War lens. The fear was that Iran’s pro-Soviet communist party was waiting ‘in the wings to seize power’. The 1953 coup resulted in a wave of political repression and the establishment of a government attractive to American and British interests on Cold War and oil issues. The coup left a significant mark on twentieth century Iranian politics and played a key role in creating the extreme anti-Pahlavi and anti-American sentiments that led to the revolution in 1979.
The US had succeeded in creating a more ‘favorable world order’ that would be beneficial to American political, economic and security needs by reinserting the Shah who was established as a pro-US leader. But, at what cost did this come to the Iranian people? The Shah took this opportunity to create an increasingly oppressive regime to ensure a level of security, a buffer, in his rule’. The Shah began working closely with the US, becoming one of America’s most trusted Cold War allies, and over next 3 years, US economic and military aid poured into Iran. For example, by the time of Richard nixon’s arrival in office in January 1969, Iran was the United State’s number one consumer of arms, if not the largest arms buyer the country had ever seen, or ever had. 
During the Presidency of former US President Richard Nixon, the US cerated a ‘unique and unprecedented relationship with the Iranian ruler… eventually named the Twin Pillar policy.’ Under this policy, the Shah was identified as one of the primary “guardians” of US interested in the Middle East, and in return, was permitted to purchase non-nuclear US military technology with a ‘blank check’. This relationship— and the now blatantly obvious fact that US had a hand in the coup— led to suspicions of anti-Americanism, although repressed. This repression led to the many ‘secretive talks’ that soon began occurring in undisclosed and rather hidden locations such as in back alleys. “American intervention locked the US into a special relationship with the Shah and signaled the powerful entrance of American intelligence and military activity into Iran. The US intervention alienated important generations of Iranians from America, and was the first fundamental step in the eventual rupture of Iranian-American relations in the revolution of 1978-79.”